The Avro Jetliner was a prototype airliner manufactured by Avro Canada in the late 1940’s. The mid range Jetliner was one of the world’s first jet powered airliners, making its maiden flight less than two weeks after the de Havilland Comet (the world’s first flight by a jet powered airliner), in August 1949. The Jetliner was revolutionary. It was close to a decade ahead of the nearest competitor in its class (the French Caravelle) and attracted intense interest after a test flight to New York City in 1950. However, the Jetliner never reached production after funding for the project was withdrawn by the Canadian government in 1951 and the prototype was eventually scraped.
Avro Canada was spawned from Victory Aircraft, a Canadian “shadow factory” that produced British aircraft during the Second World War. After the war, Victory Aircraft was sold to Hawker Siddeley (a British aviation group) and subsequently renamed. Avro Canada invested heavily in research and development from the outset, commencing work on a new jet engine and making preparations for a jet-powered fighter plane and airliner.
In early 1946, Trans-Canada Airlines (later Air Canada) entered a development agreement with Avro, commissioning the company to produce an airliner based on the new Avon jet engine being developed by Rolls-Royce. The aircraft was to seat 30 passengers, operate on existing 4,000 ft runways and cruise at speeds in excess of 400 mph with a range of 1,200 miles. The design specifications were ambitious. Contemporary fighter jets cruised at comparable speeds with a fraction of the weight and the runway restrictions provided just over half the takeoff and landing space used by similar modern airliners.
The project was entrusted to Avro’s lead engineer, Jim Floyd, at the company’s facility in Malton, Ontario. Floyd immediately set higher standards for the Jetliner than Trans-Canada Airlines had specified, hoping to accommodate future developments in the project. He prescribed a cruising speed between 425 mph and 450 mph, flying range of 1,500 miles and seating capacity for 50 passengers.
The project soon ran into difficulties. After almost a year designing the aircraft around the developmental Avon engine (specified for the Jetliner by Trans-Canada Airlines), it became apparent that the British government would not release the engine for civil use in time for the project. Around the same time, Trans-Canada Airlines took delivery of a new fleet of North Star planes and became increasingly reluctant to commit resources to the Jetliner project. The Airline still hadn’t specified how many aircraft they intended to purchase from Avro (despite the development being funded by an agreed per aircraft purchase price) and the development agreement imposed several restrictions on Avro’s ability to secure funding from other sources.
Trans-Canada Airlines soon instructed Avro to stop work on the project and confirmed that they were no longer interested in the Jetliner. Avro were left in a tenuous position, having invested heavily in the development of an advanced aircraft that was no longer wanted. The Canadian government intervened to prevent the company from collapsing, contributing $1.5 million toward the cost of developing the Jetliner, albeit at a slower rate. Trans-Canada Airlines assumed an advisory role (at the insistence of the government), despite its reluctance to remain involved with the project in any capacity. The airline’s feedback was inevitably critical of Avro, as it attempted to justify its decision and distance itself from an aircraft it no longer wanted to purchase.
By late July 1949 the prototype Jetliner was ready. However, its maiden flight was delayed by reconstruction of the Malton runway, eventually taking place on August 10. In early 1950 the Jetliner made its first high profile flight to the United States after only a few months of testing, accepting an invitation from the mayor of New York. Despite interest from several US carriers, the Jetliner returned to Canada with no confirmed buyer.
The Canadian government was becoming weary of the project’s cost and the delays Avro was experiencing with its military program. In December 1950, the government ordered Avro to stop working on the Jetliner and a second, almost complete, prototype was scrapped almost immediately. Only a few months after this directive, Howard Hughes learnt of the Jetliner and pressed Avro to produce the aircraft for him, even investigating production in the US under licence. However, the Canadian government remained adamant that Avro not distract from its military program and the Jetliner remained a prototype. In 1956 the only working prototype was donated to National Research Council (which had no room to store the aircraft) and subsequently broken up for scrap. The failure to find a purchaser for the Jetliner, along with the subsequent demise of Avro’s military projects, spelt the end to the promising post war aviation industry in Canada.
Summary by: Richard Murphy
The project soon ran into difficulties. After almost a year designing the aircraft around the developmental Avon engine (specified for the Jetliner by Trans-Canada Airlines), it became apparent that the British government would not release the engine for civil use in time for the project. Around the same time, Trans-Canada Airlines took delivery of a new fleet of North Star planes and became increasingly reluctant to commit resources to the Jetliner project. The Airline still hadn’t specified how many aircraft they intended to purchase from Avro (despite the development being funded by an agreed per aircraft purchase price) and the development agreement imposed several restrictions on Avro’s ability to secure funding from other sources.
Trans-Canada Airlines soon instructed Avro to stop work on the project and confirmed that they were no longer interested in the Jetliner. Avro were left in a tenuous position, having invested heavily in the development of an advanced aircraft that was no longer wanted. The Canadian government intervened to prevent the company from collapsing, contributing $1.5 million toward the cost of developing the Jetliner, albeit at a slower rate. Trans-Canada Airlines assumed an advisory role (at the insistence of the government), despite its reluctance to remain involved with the project in any capacity. The airline’s feedback was inevitably critical of Avro, as it attempted to justify its decision and distance itself from an aircraft it no longer wanted to purchase.
By late July 1949 the prototype Jetliner was ready. However, its maiden flight was delayed by reconstruction of the Malton runway, eventually taking place on August 10. In early 1950 the Jetliner made its first high profile flight to the United States after only a few months of testing, accepting an invitation from the mayor of New York. Despite interest from several US carriers, the Jetliner returned to Canada with no confirmed buyer.
The Canadian government was becoming weary of the project’s cost and the delays Avro was experiencing with its military program. In December 1950, the government ordered Avro to stop working on the Jetliner and a second, almost complete, prototype was scrapped almost immediately. Only a few months after this directive, Howard Hughes learnt of the Jetliner and pressed Avro to produce the aircraft for him, even investigating production in the US under licence. However, the Canadian government remained adamant that Avro not distract from its military program and the Jetliner remained a prototype. In 1956 the only working prototype was donated to National Research Council (which had no room to store the aircraft) and subsequently broken up for scrap. The failure to find a purchaser for the Jetliner, along with the subsequent demise of Avro’s military projects, spelt the end to the promising post war aviation industry in Canada.
Summary by: Richard Murphy
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